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In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-
Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Infor-
mation” and provide a correct proof.
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1 Introduction
One of the best known models of auction theory involves an informed bidder competing for
a common value object against one or more uninformed bidders. There are at least three
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1reasons why this model became so well known. First, it applies to a wide variety of situations
of interest. Second, the model and its variations perform well when matched with the data,
as has been shown by Hendricks and Porter (1988) and Hendricks, Porter and Wilson (1994)
among others. Finally, its solution is simple, intuitive and elegant.
This type of auction was described by Woods (1965) and ﬁrst studied formally by Wilson
(1967) who found an equilibrium of the bidding game. The formal model was later studied
by Weverbergh (1979) who found a mistake in Wilson’s existence proof, and used the same
(restrictive) assumptions as Wilson to ﬁnd an equilibrium. Hughart (1975) found an equilib-
rium of the same game under a diﬀerent set of assumptions. Finally, Engelbrecht-Wiggans,
Milgrom and Weber (1983) (EMW for short) found an equilibrium to the game using much
weaker assumptions. The theoretical results arising from this model have been extended to
a variety of setups by, among others, Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Hendricks, Porter and
Wilson (1994).
In general, in order to test empirically the predictions of any given model, one needs
uniqueness of equilibrium. Therefore, part of the reason why the model I analyze here
became so well known, is that EMW claimed to have proved uniqueness. In this note I show
that there is a mistake in their proof of uniqueness and provide a correct proof.
2 The Model
Player 1, the informed party, observes (h,u) where h is drawn from any distribution F
with bounded support and u is drawn independently from an atomless distribution. Players
2,...,N make no observations. The value of the object for all players is h, and the object is
sold using a ﬁrst price auction. Although this is not explicit in EMW, the strategy space Si
2for the uninformed player i is the space of distributions in R+ :
Si = {Gi : Gi is a distribution on R+}
Let
β (h,u)=E (H | H<hor (H = h and U<u ))
denote a strategy for the informed player. As EMW (correctly) argue, this is the unique
equilibrium bidding strategy of player 1.1 Furthermore, this uniqueness is established without
assuming that player 2’s equilibrium strategy is unique.
EMW goes on to claim that, for G = G2 ···GN :
Theorem 1 The N-tuple (β,G2,G 3...,GN) is an equilibrium only if
G(b)=P (β (h,u) ≤ b) (1)
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with ﬁrst order necessary condition
(h − b)G
￿ (b)=G(b), (2)
and that since this is a ﬁrst order linear diﬀerential equation in G, on a convex domain, with
the terminal condition G(E (h) )=1 , the solution is unique.
Note that the assertion that Equation (2) is a diﬀerential equation, requires that the
equilibrium G be diﬀerentiable (everywhere, not merely almost everywhere). However, as I
1This strategy is essentially unique, in the sense that one can re-order the noise variable u, and obtain
another equilibrium strategy. I thank a referee for pointing this out.
3now show, the equilibrium proposed by the authors themselves in equation (1) may not be
diﬀerentiable.
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Then, the probability that the uninformed bidder bids less than b is the probability that β (h)
is less than b :













































In the next section, I present an alternate proof of uniqueness.
4 AP r o o fo fU n i q u e n e s s
If F is degenerate, the problem is trivial, so assume F is non-degenerate. Suppose (β,G2,G 3...,GN)
and (β,J2,J 3...,JN) are two equilibria (recall that we already know that Player 1 has only
one equilibrium strategy). Since player 1 never bids above E (h), clearly
4a) G(E (h)) = J (E (h)) = 1.
I now show that
b) Gi and Ji are continuous for all i. Suppose not, and suppose that, say, Gi is not
continuous, so that for some B ∈ [0,E(h)] and some j>0, for all ε>0,G(B) −
G(B − ε) ≥ j. Then for some δ>0 all types h whose bid distributions have support
intersecting (B − δ,B), are strictly better oﬀ bidding slightly above B, contradicting
the fact that the support of 1’s equilibrium bids is [0,E(h)].
Let h be the minimal element of the support of F and by h its maximal element. If the
two equilibria are diﬀerent, there must be some b￿= ∈ [0,E(h)) such that G(b￿=)  = J (b￿=),
so suppose without loss of generality that G(b￿=) >J(b￿=) and deﬁne K = G − J. Since by
(b) K is continuous, let [b￿=,b =] be the unique interval on which
c) K (b) > 0 for all b ∈ [b￿=,b =) and K (b=)=0 .
Let h￿= be a type for which b￿= is optimal, and let h= be a type for which b= is optimal.
I now show that h￿=  = h=. Suppose to the contrary that h￿= = h=. Since b￿= <b =, we have
that h￿= >hbecause the only equilibirum bid of h is h. If type h = h￿= = h= makes two
diﬀerent equilibrium bids, there must be an atom at h. Therefore, using (b) there is an
interval I =( b￿=,b ￿= + ε) such that for all b ∈ I, G(b) >J(b) and every b in the interval is an
equilibrium bid of h￿=. Since b= is an equilibrium bid of h￿=, almost every equilibrium bid of
h￿= must yield the same payoﬀ as bidding b=, namely (h￿= − b=)G(b=) which, by (c), equals
(h￿= −b=)J (b=). Therefore, for almost every b ∈ I, we have
(h￿= − b)G(b)=( h￿= − b)J (b).
Because F is non degenerate and h￿= >h , h￿= >b ,which together with the last equation
yield G(b)=J (b), a contradiction.
5Let H denote the convex hull of the support of F, and let b : H→R be any selection
from β (·,u) such that b(h￿=)=b￿= and b(h=)=b= (note that β is well deﬁned for all h ∈ H).
For all types h ∈ (h￿=,h =), if b is an equilibrium bid of h, then b ∈ (b￿=,b =), and so K (b) > 0.
That is,
d) for all h ∈ (h￿=,h =),K(b(h)) > 0
By Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002), for all h ∈ [h￿=,h =],









((h − b(h)))K (b(h) )=( ( h −b(h)))[G(b(h)) − J (b(h))] (4)




The following inequalities constitute a contradiction, proving that G = J:
0=( ( h= −b(h=)))K (b(h=)) (deﬁnition of h=)
=( ( h − b(h)))K (b(h)) +
h= ￿
h
K (b(s))ds (equation (4))







≥ ((h − b(h)))K (b(h)) +
h￿= ￿
h
K (b(s))ds (literal (d))
=( ( h￿= −b(h￿=)))K (b(h￿=)) > 0( h￿= >b(h￿=) and K (b(h￿=)) > 0)
QED
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